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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF urAH
DALE H. DDlILLE, Administrator
of the Estate of Terry Lee De.Mille
and Constance Hope DeMille, also
known as Connie DeMille, deceased,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

PHYLLIS ERICKSON, Administratrix
of the Estate of Frederick Kenneth
Spendlove, deceased,
Defendant and Appellant.

)
)

)

Case No.
11385

)
)

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff and Respondent Dale

w.

DeMille

respectfully petitions the Court to grant· a
rehearing of the captioned matter upon the
following grounds and reasons:
POINT I
The physical evidence, viewed in a light
favorable to Plaintiff, compels the conclusion
that the Spendlove vehicle was well across the

center line at the moment of impact and that the

- 2 Jrivcr thereof w<is negligent in causing the death

of Constance Hope DeMille.

POINT II
The Court re-examined and determined the
facts contrary to the decision of the jury and in
a light most favorable to the Defendant in
arriving at its decision in violation of the
jurisdictional limits placed upon its powers of
appellate review by the Constitution and Statutes
of the State of Utah.

POINT III
The Court's decision denies Plaintiff equal
protection of the laws in violation of Article I,
Section 24, of the Constitution of the State of
Utah

and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States.

DATED this 9th day of January, 1970.
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN
AND HENRIOD
and

- 3 -

J. Harlan Burns
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN A LIGHT
?!1VORABLE TO PLAINTIFF, COMPELS THE CONCLUSION
TUAT Tilli SPENDLOVE VEHICLE WAS WELL ACROSS THE
CZ'.:lTER LINE AT THE MOMENT OF IMPACT AND THAT THE
DRIVER TiillREOF WAS NEGLIGENT IN CAUSING THE DEATH

OF CONSTANCE HOPE DEMILLE.

The starting point in the law of evidence
applying to a no eye-witness head-on collision in
Ulah is Hood v. Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co.,

6 Utah 2d 340, 313 P.2d 800 (1957).
cecision

th~

In that

Court expressly held that conditions

existing on t,he highway in a no eye-witness headon collision may give rise to certain inferences
of fact respecting the position of the respective

automobiles at . the time of impact from which

- 4 11c:.,l:i.(;ence from being on the wrong side of the
hi;;lmay can be presumed.

This is so regardless

of the fact no one exists who can explain why the
driver i;;as on the wrong side of the road.

The

.'ood case makes exceedingly clear that there is
no presumption of due care in a case where the
physical facts show negligence from being on the
wrong side of the road.

The Wood decision places

Utah in line with a number of decisions from
other jurisdictions to the effect that the
physical facts and circumstances of a collision
may be sufficiently clear to warrant the trial
court in submitting the questions of how the
collision occurred and who was at fault to a jury
for decision even in the total absence of eyewitness .testimony.

Wilson v. Barnes, 224 S.W.2d

892 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1949); Baumler v.

Hazelwood, 347 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1961); and
~elin v.

Consumers Coop Ass'n, 241 P.2d 693

(Kan. 1952).

- s In the instant case even counsel for the
De:~e:ndant

must concede that if the Spendlove

rehicle uas partly across the center line, its
driver, Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, was
i1e~li;;cni:
~he

as a matter of law ii;i contributing to

collision.

This is so because Defendant's

counsel took precisely this position with respect
to the DcHille automobile which all concede was
partly across the center line at the time of
im?act.

The Trial Court agreed with Defendant 1 s

counsel and dismissed the suit as to Terry Lee
DeMille on the ground he was contributorily
.-ic:.;li;;ent as a matter of law because the physical
Zacts showed. he was partly across the center line
Qt

the time of impact.

Both counsel for the

DC'fondai-it. and the Trial Court drew from the place
uf impact and from the other undisputed facts of

Lhe accident an inference of negligence as to the
J~ILlle

vehicle so strong both were willing to

draw it as a matter of law--as. a matter upon

- 6 ,,,,;~c;1

rcaGonable minds could not disa3ree.

The sole and only
~.Jets

di~ference

in the physical

as to the two vehicles was the number of

i:eet and inches each was across the center line
when they collided; that is, neither attempted to
stop or take any evasive action prior to the

collision but proceeded to the point of impact
without skidding, without swerving and without
any particular reduction of speed.

The

tremendous head-on impact, the fact no skid marks
were left up to the point of impact and the fact
neither vehicle rolled over leave room for no
other inference but that both proceeded to the
point of

im~act

in the same or nearly the same

manner.

The question left for the jury as to the

Spendlove vehicle was whether it was over the
center line at the time of ·the collision.
Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to
Plaintiff as the Court must as this is a law-jury
case, it undisputably appears. that the Spendlove

- 7 whicle was

wel~

across the center line at the

Lime of impact so that Defendant 1 s decedent was
negligent as a matter of law.
1.

The sharp gouge mark numbered Point 6 on

ilxhibit 5 was nearest the center white line-actually at the edge of the white line (Tr. 51,
54).

2.

This gouge was made by a sharp.portion of

the undercarriage or frame of the Vo~kswagen--a.

part between the wheels.
fra~e

It was made when the

and_ undercarriage were smashed to the

ground and the wheels were collapsed in the
collision (Tr. 169, ·171, 174). ·
3.

A rubber scuff mark about 20 inches _wide

with a scrape in the center was 49 inches east
from the center of ,the white center line_(Tr. 32).
The easternmost edge of this mark was barely the

Width of the Volkswagen (60 inches) away from the
center line.
4.

The entire front end of the Volkswagen

- 8 ::c.s sm~shc<l

to the ground in the impact and

~

front uhccls of the Volkswagen uere collapsed to
ti1e east or ri9ht; that is, to the east or right

of a driver seated in the Volkswagen and the
right wheel of the Volkswagen was thrust

~head

of

Lhe left front wheel (Plaintiff 1 s Exhibit 11).
Exhibit 11 shows that the primary damage to the
Volkswagen occurred to the front and to the west
or left side; that is, the driver's side, and
that the front portion of the Volkswagen was all
smashed down to the east--to its driver's right.
5.

A rubber skid mark made by the Volkswagep

commenced in the west lane (the Chevrolet's lane)
105 inches to the rear or south of the foregoing
mentioned marks and ran east through the east
lane towards the point at which the Volkswagen
finally came to rest (Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and

u, Tr. 35, 36).
6.

It is clear from the evidence that the

i!olkswagen was traveling north at the time of the

- 9 ~ccident;

7.

the Chevrolet south.

The photographs in evidence show both

~u~ooobiles

came to rest east of the center line.

The Volkswagen was off the traveled portion and

the Chevrolet was about in the center of the east
lane.

The Volkswagen changed direction after

impnct and was knocked back towards the south
from whence it had come.

The Chevrolet, after

smnshing the Volkswagen to the ground, continued
south, apparently being lifted into the air and

thrust sideways by the impact.

It traveled in

this manner some distance before coming down on
the highway, skiddfog southward down the highway
sideways some distance, finally orienting itself
to point nearly south again as it came to rest.
8.

The scrapes and marks on the highway made

by the Volkswagen were made when its front end
was smashed down to the right and east in the

collision.
The sole, solitary reasonable deduction to be

- 10 drmm from the foregoing as to the position
of the Volkswagen as to the center line at the
yoint of initial impact is that the Volkswagen
was some>vhat to the left or west of the scrape

marks at the moment of impact and that it left
the marks when smashed eastward to its driver's

fight.

This would necessarily have to be so

(.liven the eastern direction towards which the

front end of the Volkswagen was collapsed, the
north direction in which it was traveling prior
to the collision and its position off the east
lane after the collision.

The necessary result is that the Volkswagen
was well over the center line at the time of

initial impact.
It is forth.er manifestly reasonable and

cousistent to infer that the skid mark made by
the Volkswagen (Point 2 on Exhibits 5 and 6)

commencing in the west lane was made not after
any rotation of the Volkswagen but by its rear

- 11 wheel or wheels as it was knocked dovmwards,
backwards and towards the east off the highway by
the Chevrolet.

The fact that the occupants were

not thrown out of the left side of the Volkswagen
until it was off the highway and the direction

the Volkswagen faced at its resting point are

much more consistent with this conclusion than
any violent rotation of the

immediately on impact.

Vo~kswagen

So also is the fact the

skid mark was 105 inches from the scuff mark-exactly where the former would be expected if

made by the right rear wheel

a~

the Volkswagen

was knocked backwards and sideways in the
collision.

Being smashed down on the highway in

the collision, how the Volkswagen could leap in
the air after t'he Chevrolet passed over it and
~void

any dragging of its rear tires or anything

else while a turn of nearly 180 degrees was
executed asks for an extreme strain of· reason.
'!he striations in the rubber scuff mark marked as

- 12 ~oint

1 on E;,hibits 5 and 6 are consistent with a

ra~idly

sp-inning tire being suddenly slammed

, sideways on the road and certainly do not call
for a conclusion the Volkswagen was violently
rotated counterclockwise.
Even if the Volkswagen could have first
rotated and then left the skid mark in the
Chevrolet's lane, still there is no conceivable
11ay the Volkswagen could have left the sharp
~ouge

mark at the very edge of the center line

arrd the scuff mark only 49 inches away from the
' center line upon the collapsation of its front
\!heels and front end to the east unless it was
across the center line at the moment of initial
impact.

Only if the Volkswagen's front wheels

had been collapsed to its own driver's left or
Lo11ards the west, then, and only then, would the
location of the marks have been inconclusive as
respects the position of the Volkswagen as to the
c~nter

line at the moment of impact and just

. - 13 ~Jrior

to the collision.

There is absolutely no

uay consistent with the physical evidence that
the Volkswagen could have been pushed west

to11ards the center of the highway on impact as
stated in the concurring opinion.

The impact was

into the driver's side of the Volkswagen.

This

pushed the Volkswagen wheels to the right.

The

· Volkswa3en ended up on the east side of the
highway.

I

I opposite conclusion to that stated in the

!

I

concurring opinion, i.e. that the Volkswagen was
pushed away and not towards the center of the
highuay.

II

Measuring from the west edge of the

,scuff mark, and it is necessary to measure from
the western edge because the wheel was collapsed

towards the east, places the Volkswagen about a
foot and a half over the center line at the time

I

i
I'

These facts compel precisely the

of impact.

The counterclockwise rotation of the

Volkswagen after impact postulated by Officer

Borch was doubtless rejected by the jury who

- 14 probably inferred from the evidence that the
striations in the scuff mark were, in fact, made·
'oy the fonrard spinning motion of the wheel as i t

collapsed and that being struck mainly on the
driver's half the Volkswagen was, in fact, driven.·
backwards and in a southeasterly direction,
rotating in a clockwise fashion about 120 degrees
as it traveled backwards until it came to rest
off the shoulder of the highway, throwing the
occupants out o.n its left hand or driver's side
as it stopped.
1

The position of the bodies of the

occupants are consistent with this hypothesis.
So are the scrape marks on the road.
0kid

So is the

mark commencing one foot seven inches into

the west lane made by the rear wheels of the

Volkswagen after the impact, the force of which
changed its direction.

From all the evidence,

the jury l1ere compelled to believe the Volkswagen
11as traveling at least one foot seven inches over
1

the center line at the time of impact and that

- 15 ueon impact its front end and undercarriage were
colL1pse<l to the right within the two feet

maximum movement limit postulated by Officer
Burch to the place where the front end left. the
gou:;e marks found, one of which was at the edge

of the center line and that the rear wheels of
the Volkswagen, not being collapsed, left the
skid mark found at Point 2 on Plaintiff's Exhibit

'

.Jo

The conclusion that the Volkswagen was across
the line is compelled by all of the tangible,
physical, undisputed evidence which was placed
before the jury.

The jury did so conclude and

from that fact naturally drew the same inference
of negligence as to the Volkswagen driver as
counsel for the Defendant asked the Court to draw
and which the Court did draw as to the Chevrolet
driver as a matter of law.
Under Hood v. Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co.,
6 Utah 2d 340, 313 P .2d 800 (1957), Plaintiff

- 16 ~~irly

obtained the verdict rendered and the

juci0mcnt entered upon it should be sustained.
It is respectfully but earnestly submitted
that the Court improperly evaluated and weighed
;he evidence and even resolved every inference
therefrom in a light most favorable to Defendant '
and that it even had to ignore substantial

portions of the undisputed physical evidence to
reach the conclusions that it did.
POINT II
'lliE COURT RE-EXAMINED AND DETERMINED THE FACTS

CO:-ITRARY TO THE DECISION OF THE JURY AND IN A

LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT IN ARRIVING
, AT ITS DECISION 1N VIOLATION OF THE

Jlffi.ISDICTIONAL LJMITS PLACED UPON ITS POWERS OF
Ai'PELLATE REVIEW BY THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah is limited by Article
VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution which

- 17 provicle.s in material part as follows:

". • • In

equity cases the appeal. may be on questions of
both lau and fact; in cases at law the apJ,Jeal
shall be on questions of law alone • • • ".
The legislature has provided the same rule by.
statute.

Section 78-2•2, Utah Code Annotated,

· 1953, provides:

11

•

•

•

In equity cases the appeal

may be on questions of both law and fact; in
cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of
law alone. •

..
II

Under these constitutional and statutory
provisions, the Supreme Court is absolutely
powerless to substitute its evaluation of

t~e

evidence for that of the trial court or trial
jury.

Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P.2d 408

(1951); Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 244, 342 P.2d
1

1

867 (1959).

It is elementary that the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, with the
exception of the extraordinary.writs, is
appellate only.

The Supreme Court does not sit

- 18 1s a trial court in any way, shape or form in the

ordinary law or equity action.

State v. Kinder,

M Utah 2d 199, 381 P.2d 82 (1963).

The

juri::;diction of the Court of course is a
fundamental matter always recognized by the Court
even on its own motion.

It cannot proceed beyond

its jurisdiction even though the parti~s be

i uilling.
U~ah

\/old berg v. Industrial Commission, 74

309, 279 Pac. 609 (1929) and Logan City v.

~lotter,

75 Utah 272, 284 Pac. 333 (1930).

\Jithout referring to the constitutional and
statutory basis of its appellate jurisdiction,
the Court has time and time again held that .it

cannot and will not weigh conflicting evidence in
a law case whether tried to the court or ju ...·y
1~ill

an~·

in no event re-determine questions of fact

in a jury case.

Lyman v. To~m of Price, 63 Utah

90, 222 Pac. 599 (1924).

Sine v. Salt Lake

~sp. Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944)

and Reynolds v.

w.

W. Clyde & Co., 5 Utah 2d 151

- 19 2~3

P.2d )30 (1956) and Stickle v. Union Pacific

~'

122 Utah 477, 251 P.2d 867 (1962).

The

Supreme Court of the State of Utah succinctly
stated the jurisprudential reasons why this is so
in Stickle:

ncourts, as final arbiters of law, could
to themselves arbitrary and
dan::;crous powers by presuming to determine
questions of fact which litigants have a
ri::;ht to have passed upon by juries. Part of
the raerit of the jury system is its
safe::;uarding against such arbitrary power in
the courts. To the great credit of the
courts of this country, they have been
extremely reluctant to infringe upon this
right, and by leaving it unimpaired have kept
the administration of justice close to the
people." 251 P .2d at 871.
arro~ate

Under section 9, art. 8, Const. (Utah),
the Supreme Court, in cases at law tried
before a court without a jury, will examine
the evidence only so far as may be necessary
to determine questions of law, and will not
pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
justify a finding or judgment, unless there
is no legitimate proof to support it. In no
case at law, whether tried with or without a
jury, can the appellate court determine
questions of fact. 1
111

"This rule has been reiterated and applied
in subsequent cases too numerous to mention."
Lyman v. Town of Price, 222 Pac •. at 600.
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In the

Reynold~

case cited above, the Court

held:

"Only those verdicts that appear to be
unsupported by any credible evidence that
Hould justify them in the minds of reasonable
men, do we disturb. That is the jury system.

. ..

•
•
• it· hardly bears repeating that in a
case like this the factual situation will be
reviewed on appeal in a light most favorable
to the party prevailing below.
11

...

"
.in cases where there is substantial
evidence which, if believed, will support the.
jury's verdict, the trial court may exercise
its discretion in sustaining the verdict, and
ue, having no discretion in such event, must
sustain both. 11
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d
187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956), stressed the

jurisdictional rule concerning jury found facts
as follo\·1s:

"This case having been tried to a jury,
they were the exclusive judges of the
evidence and of the inferences to be drawn
therefrom. It was not the privilege of the
court to disagree with and overrule their
action unless the evidence so unerringly

- 21 :'ointccl to a contrary conclusion that there
e::i:::tcd no reasonable basis for the jury's
iincl:i.n:;. This court has many times affirmed
con:r,1::.tmcnt to a policy of reluctance to
intc;_·fcre uith findings of fact and verdicts
renc:c;.·cd by juries, and has declared that is
(sic) should be done only when the matter is
so clear as to be free from doubt. In Butz v.
U;1ion Pac. R.R. we quoted with approval the
lan~:;;_,age of Justice Murphy, speaking for the
u,1i tccl States Supreme Court with respect to
trial by jury: '"· • .A right so fundamental
and ::;acred to the citizen, whether guaranteed
by the Constitution or provided by statute,
should be :jealousy guarded by the courts.' "
,\ga::.n, in Si::icl•le v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., we
stated '' • • • ue remain cognizant of the vital
importance of the privilege of trial by jury
in our system of justice and deem it our duty
to zealously protect and preserve it.'" 299
P.2d at 626.
The principle that a finding of fact by a
jm.7 is conclusive and will not be overturned if

supported by evidence and that the Court will

never evaluate and weigh the evidence in a law
case, particularly a jury case~ has been followed

in other cases too numerous to mention.

See, for

e:;ample, Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp.,
il3 Utah l,L;l,, 202 P.2d 727 (1949); Seybold v.
~on Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 239. P.2d 174

- 22 (i0'.;l); and Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Utah 2d 328

293 r.2<l 925 (1956).
In the Seybold case the Court expressly
a?provccl Ui:;more 1 s rule as to the quantum of

evidence needed to support a jury finding which
is:

"Are there facts in evidence which if

u:i.'.l::i.swered would justify men of ordinary reason
arr<l fairness in affinning the question which the
plaintiff is bound to maintain."

239 P .2d at 177.

T;1e question which the Plaintiff was bound to
maintain in the instant case was basically
whether or not negligence of the driver of the
Spendlove vehicle caused the accident.

He was

negligent if on the wrong side of the highway at
the tirae of the accident.

The facts in evidence

justified the jury in finding and the trial court
ln affinning that the Volkswagen was on the wrong
side so negligence existed.

As pointed out under

f'olnt I above, not oniy do the physical facts in
evidence permit an inference the Volkswagen was

- 23 on the urong side of the road, they compel
e;;actly tl1at conclusion.

Facts not so compelling

uould have been sufficient to take the case to
the jur)' because the party favored by the verdict
is entitled to have the Supreme Court consider

all the evidence, and every inference and
intcnclment fairly arising therefrom in a light
most favorable to him.

Taylor

v.

Weber County,

~·

The Court plainly evaluated and weighed the
evidence and interpreted it in a light most
favorable to Defendant and not to Plaintiff in
arriving at its decision.

Plaintiff is cognizant

of the principle that a party is not entitled to

uniform judicial decisions.

However, should the

Court's opinion be construed as only overturning
the judicial rule that the evidence is viewed in
a light favorable to the prevailing party, that
, 11ould not solve the matter.

The Court still went

beyond the jurisdictional limits placed by the

- 24 co,1::;titution and Statutes upon its powers of
~~cllatc

review.

nccausc the Court

~ecided

questions of fact

contrary not only to the jury's decision but to
co,1clusions compelled by undisputed physical·
evidence, Plaintiff is entitled to a rehearing.
Upon rehearing,

the Court should apply the rules

of appellate review to the case in a manner

consiste..-it with Article VIII, Section 9,

ol

the

Utah Constitution and Section 78-2-2, Utah Code

Annotated (1953).
POINT III
THE COlmT 1 S DECISION DENIES PLAINTIFF EQUAL
l'I',OT:- ~:TIOrl OF THE LAH IN VIOIATION OF ARTICLE I,

SECTION 2L}, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
llfMI AND THE 14TII AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

OF TUE IBUTED STATES.

Article 1, Section 24, of the Constitution of
1

1

;1e State of Utah provides:

"All laws of

a

uener.:il nature· shall have uniform operation."
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Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States provides in
oaterial part:
". • .No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridGe the privile::;es or
inununities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
Plaintiff was denied the right to have a jury
detennination of the issues in a law case, which
bears no distinguishable difference from the
great

nu~ber

of other law cases in which jury

verdicts have been given a degree of sanctity in
Utah, in violation of the above constitutional

provisions.
In a civil jury case the parties have a
i

constitutional right to have the jury determine
the facts:

"In civil cases three-fourths of the

jurors may find a verdict."
Sec, 10.

Consti. Utah, Art. I,

- 26 Since the jury has the constitutional right
to find a verdict in a

ju~y

case, neither the

ti·ial cou:Lt nor the Supreme Court have the right

to

it away.

tal~e

This most basic and fundamental

jurisprudential doctrine is also of constitutional
status in the federal system.

The 7th Amendment

to t[1e Constitution of the United States provides:
"In Suits at conunon law, where the value in
i

controversy shall exceed t't.Jenty dollars, the

I i'i~ht

of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no

' fact tried. by a jury, shall be otherwise re! examined
i

in any Court of the United States, than

accord in·'"' to the :cuies of the common law."
(Gmphasis added)
llhile i t is true that the 7th Amendment has

· cot yet been held applicable to the states by
• virtue of the due-process clause of the 14th

I

""11 e11dment,

Supreme

it is also true that the United States

Court has recently held that the

: ~uarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases

!

- 27 :irnvickd by the 6th i\mendment is a fundamental
c'.uc-proccss right required of the states under
~he
~5,

The

lLrth Amendment.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.

20 L. ed.2d 491, 88 Sup. Ct. 1444 (1968).
United States Supreme Court there simply held:
Decause we believe that trial by jury in
cases is fundamental to the American
schE:me of justice, we hold that the
Fou~teenth lunendment guarantees a right of
jury trial in all criminal cases which--were
they to be tried in a federal court--would
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."
391 U.S. at ll~9, 20 L. ed.2d at 496.
'

1

c~im:Qal

In view of the Duncan case and other recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States which have included more and more of the
Bill of Rights in the guarantees provided
citizens of each state through the 14th Amendment,
it seems probable that the 7th Amendment 1 s
~Ll~rantee

of trial by jury in civil cases will

soon be held mandatory upon the states.

Certainly there is no rational basis founded in
principle upon which trial by jury can be said to
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.,c of fundnn1erltal importance in a criminal case,
but ,1ot

in a civil case.

~rocccdin0s

Certainly both type of

materially affect lives and property.

fa Duncan the defendant suffered a sixty-day
i [erm in prison (during which he would, of course,

:i, cared for at the expense of the State) and the
loss of only $150.00, the amount of his fine.

In

this case the small children represented by
Plaintiff who have already lost their parents who
leit practically no estate in excess of burial
cosl:s and the like for them are apparently to
lose a $23,000.00 jury verdict, the forfeiture of
which will sentence them to the charity of

relatives or friends for years and affect their
lives far more materially and permanently than
the life of the defendant in Duncan would have
lieen affected by the relatively light

disabilities imposed on him.
1

Where· is the

distinction in equity, justice, morals or logic?
Not only does jury determination of fact

- 29 r;icii:~crs

:~a

a jury case have a constitutional

{ound.J.tion, it is a right provided by two Utah
sta~utcs.

Section 78-21-1, Utah Code Annotated,

1953, provides in material part:

"In actions ••

. for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a
jury.

• • 11

Section 78-21-2 a clearer directive.

It specifically directs:
\1l1~rc

"All questions of fact,

the trial is by jury. • • are to be decided

Ly the jury • • • "

(Emphasis added)

The protection of these statutes and the
2rotection of the decisional ·1aw which has
developed to the same effect was denied Plaintiff
by the decision of the Court in the instant case

lor the simple reason that there was more than
ilillple basis for the jury's decision founded in
the uncontrovertable physical evidence, and yet
the Court found the facts to be othewise than the
jury ~1ad found, not applying to Plaintiff's case

t:1e principle stated in the statutes cited above
and the great abundance of decisional law which

- 30 l1c.s been developed to the same effect.

i)laintiff has thus

be~n

denied equal

?rotection of the law that the jury decides the
fact::;;
~rity

' they

that verdicts of juries have

~

degree of

and that they will not be upset unless

find no support in the evidence.

'rTl:e purpose of a trial is to afford the
partie::; a full and fair opportunity to
present their evidence and contentions and to
have the issues in dispute beti;·1een them
determined by a jury. Uhen this objective
has been accomplished, and the trial court
has ;3iven its approval thereto by refusing to
:;rant a new trial, the judgment should be
looked upon \vi th some degree of verity. The
presumption is in favor of its validity and
the burden is upon the appellant to show some
persuasive reason for upsetting it. Under
the cardinal and oft-repeated rule of review,
uc will not disturb the jury's finding so
lon~ a3 it is supported by substantial
evidence, that is, evidence which, together
uith the fair inferences that may be dra\'m
therefrom, reasonable minds could conclude as
the jury did; and we will not reverse a
jud0ffient entered thereon unless in arriving
at it substantial and prejudicial error was
comr:iitted in the sense that in its absence
the:;:-e is a reasonable likelihood that there
uould have been a different result." Gordon
v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 290, 391 P.2d
430, 433 (1964).

- 31 ;i;c: ,;:_JUrt hc..s heretofore always observed the
1

rLnciplc stated in Justice Crockett's dissenting
ii,1ion--ihat it is not a matter of whether the

01

~u;-icc;ilc

Court agrees or disagrees with the jury

1erdict \;hich is the controlling factor.

In Page

v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 18 Utah 2d 210, 418

P.2cl 231 (1966), an insurance agent bought two

policies of fire insurance on a building costing
only $1,600.00.

He moved the building to a sit_e

11ilere the State would take it by condeI1U1ation for

a freeuay and it burned down.

The agent sued on

the policies and recovered a total of $30,000.00~

Justice Henriod stated he would have certainly

denied any recovery whatsoever; but since the· .,, ·
jury had believed otherwise on controverted
~vidence,

"on

L~

its verdict would have to be sustained

,:liar principJ,es of appellate review."

Plaintiff has been denied application of the
:'.ctle of Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312,

249 P.2d 213 (1952).

This case involved a

- 32 collision between a cab and a bicycle on a dark,
r;1iny night.

An appeal was taken from a directed

verdict for the defendant which was rendered on
the basis that contributory negligence existed as
a raJ.tter of law.

The Supreme

~ourt

reversed and

directed that the cause be submitted to the jury.
i:~le are committed to the principle that
matters of negligence, contributory
neglir;ence and proximate cause gene:cally are
jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts
are of such conclusive character as to
require all reasonable minds to conclude that
the ultimate fact of negligence, contributory
negligence or proximate cause does or does
not exist. 11 249 P.2d at 215.

Had this principle been applied to the instant
cn~e,

the resuit certainly would have been

different because the uncontroverted evidentiary
facts do not only amply and sufficiently support
the conclusion the Volkswagen was on the wrong
side of the road at the time 'the collision
occurred, they absolutely compel such conclusion.
The decision of the Court amounts to a
holdin8 that not only the jury but the trial
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1

.:ind the dissenting judge are all manifestly

u,1;e:asonable in their evaluation and consideration
o~

the evidence.

Yet it has often been held by

t;:e court that where the facts and circumstances

ace such that there is doubt as to whether·
reasonable men might arrive at different
conclusions, then this very doubt means the
~c;estion

is one for the jury and not one of law

for the court.

Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande

':ectern R.R. Co., 9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P .2d 215
(1959).

Plaintiff has been denied equal

protection of the rule always heretofore applied
~Y

the court that unless a reasonable man could

not come i:o the conclusion in question even when

all of the evidence and the.inferences fairly
tlerived therefrom are taken in a light most
iavorable thereto, a jury verdict will not be set
a3i<le.

Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d

60 (1960).

Newton v. Oregon Shortline R.R. Co.,

";J Utah 219, 134 Pac. 56} (1913) and Stickle v.

- 34 0 ,_c.;,1

Pc.cific R. Co., 122 Utah 477, 251 P .2d 867

(1952)

I'l.:iintiff earnestly submits·that Plaintiff
1;as

danied equal protection of the law that

~uest ions

of fact in a law case are for the jury;

that physical· circumstantial evidence alone on a
road in a no eye.-witness case showing a vehicle
to have been on the wrong side of the road at the
mor.1ent the accident happened is sufficient
evidence. of negligence to take the case to the
jury; that the Court will not overturn a jury ·

verdict unless there is no evidence to support.it
and that the evidence will be viewed on appeal in

a light favorable to the prevailing party.

:'L\intiff submits that there is no basis whatever
i rnr :;:oefusing to apply these elementary rules to
t11e

instant case and no basis upon ·which the

i:ist:illt case can be distinguished from the
Liultitude of other negligence cases in which such

:ulcs are applied.

- 35 Under Article 1, Section 24, of the
Co1<:.;L.i.~ut::.on
u,i.:[1

of the State of Utnh nnd under the

:\1.1cc1dr.ien.t, Pla.intiff is entitled to the same

rules o.2 evidence and procedure for the security
of his ri.::;l1ts and cause of action as anyone else
<.md pa:cticularly to fair, non-discriminatcry
.i~iplico.tion.

of Utah laws relating to juries.

'J',:u.'.'.:: v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254,

42 Su;>. Ct. 124 (192l);Connolly v. Union Sewer
- ~ip8 Co., 184 U.S. 540, 46

L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct.

431 (1901); Black v. Caldwell, 83 Fed. 880 (D.
iwnt. 1897); Board of Education v. Alliance

Assur~

0_:_, 159 Fed. 99.:'., (N. D. Cal. 1908); Alton V.
P~~llins

Co. v. State, 396 P.2d 537 (Wash. 1964);

:'.:.:~25"':I v.

Superior Court, 257 P.2d 661 (Cal. 1953);

:_ioi-~~J.llti

v. Horgan.ti, 222 P .2d 78 (Cal. 1950); In

l(C: 'l'~urnr:i2r,

36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177 (Sup.

Ci:. Cal. 1964); DEGNAN, Ri3ht to Civil Jury Trial
1:-i

U'cah; Constitution and Statute, 8 Utah L. Rev.

S7, 99 (1962) and 16 AM. JUR.2d, Constitutional
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~,

....·~cc.

I,1

533.

T;~ua:~

v. Corriean, supra, an Arizona law

;irohioiting a court from affording an employer
tile equitable relief of an injunction in a labor
dis~mte

uas held to violate the equal protection

cl2.use o:Z the Constitution.

The Court held that

it uas beside the point to say that the

?laintiffs in that case had no vested right to a
certain type of equitable relief so that taking
it away did not deprive them of due process of
LZL11.

The Court held that the 14th Amendment

irrtended that equal protection and security
should be given to all under lil~e circumstances
and that this

i~cluded

like access to the courts

ot the country under like tenns for the
2rotcction of person and property.

Black v.

b_lducll, supra, involved a statute of the State
o~

llontana susceptible ·to an interpretation

forbiddin3 a foreign corporation from purchasing
)toperty at a judicial foreclosure sale.

The

- 37 court held any such interpretation would violate
L.,1c

cc;,ual protection clause of the 14th l.mendment.

~~2

caGe of Board of

Ed~cation

of Alliance Assur.

Co., supra, was. concerned with a statute in the
State of California which required insurance
companies in defending suits on policies to plead
cc:.::tain matters in their answers specifically and
ii1 a certain manner.

Lasis

c:~isted

The Court held no valid

for requiring this of insurance

cor,1panies in the limited cases covered by the
statute so that the statute denied equal
proL:ection of the law.
~,

Alton V. Phillips Co. v. ·

sunra, involved a contractor which brought

suit against the state for claims arising under a
public contract.
1

lc~islature

His suit was dismissed and the

then passed a special act allowing a

suit at the instance of the contractor and waiving
~:1c ~eneral
~ontractor

statutes of limitation.

The

thereupon again brought suit.

Court dismissed on the grounds the special

The

- 38 lc:::;is.lai:ion violated the equal protection clause

oi t"nc lL:-th .\men<lment and provisions of
.. ~::;'.1in:_;ton' s Constitution.

The Court quoted the

folloui.n::; \1ith approval from the case of no 0 ni v •
.'crn::ti, 22l, Hass. 152, 112 N.E. 853,. L.R.A.

191GF, G31 (1916), which was cited with approval

in Sirrine v. State, 132

s.c.

241, 128 S.E. 172

(1925):

It is an essential element of equal
protection of the laus that each person shall
possess t:1e unhampered right to assert in the
conrl:s h::_s ri 0 hts, (sic) ''1ithout
ci:_::;crirnination, by the same rrocccses against'
t:10sc uh.a \'lrOn:i '1im as are open to every
otl.1c;: person. The courts must be onen to all
nno;1 the same terms. No obstacles can be
tLro~:n in the uay of some which a:;..·c· not
intcr~oseci in the nath of others.
Recourse
to t:1c l2.\7 oy all alike without partiality or.
;~vor, for the vindication of rights and the
r~(~ess of \rrongs is essential to equality
bc.:0:. .-2 the la,1. 1 "
(Emrhasis added in the
Alton V. Phillips decision)
"

ln

1

A~ncu v.

Superior Court, 257 P.2d 661 (Cal.

l9~3) various proceedings against the petitioner

;,c:d been taken in juvenile court and municipal
coui.-t in the course of which petitioner appealed
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;:-,.~

not pe:nnitted to perfect her appeal since

cJ..e:cl: .'.:i1d reporter had not: prepared a

~;"ncc:dpt.

The district court held, among other

t;1:i.r(;s, that the.

~uppression

of the exercise of

t;1e :ci;:;ht to appeal amounted to a clea.:- denial of
~~ud

:H·otection of law which was prohibited by

t'.;e 1L:.t:1 l.m.enclment.

In t:1e case before the Court the decision of
t~

court effectively suppresses, denies and

c::::~ec

fro;:u Plaintiff its right to a jury

determincition of the issues under circumst.ances
not aPi)lied to any other person or in any other

cacc.

Such clearly amounts to a denial of the

equal protection of law guaranteed by the 14th·

,\.r.1cndment.
In 11orµant i v. Horgan ti, 222 P. 2d 78 (Cal.

l9SG), the court held violative of the equal

Jrotcction clause a certain provision of the
' C::tlifornia Civil Code which required in a
01

vorce case for insanity that the plaintiff

-

L;O -

:lL::c dnd prove financial ability to support the

!

~ci:!nC:ant

for life as a condition to obtaining a

divorce.

The Court held this. denied equal

pro;:ect:;_on of the laws because it made the right
to a divorce for insanity dependent solely upon
the financial condition of the parties.

In Re Trummer, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d
177 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1964), is directly in point.
In that case the petitioner was adjudged a

narcotics addict.

He contended, among other

rhings, that although there was no initial

constitutional right to a jury trial in a
narcotics commitment proceeding in California, by
affording a jury trial on the issues of addiction
to ccrta.in categories of persons committed ior

W&s

provided for in proceedings in a municipal or

---
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court under certain sections of the penal

;iut uas not provided for under other

~;:;cl: . . ons

covcri'.1;; proceedings taken for the same

/J~·:)oscs

Hi

~rounds

a superior court.

No reasonable

existed for the distinction in the

vacious raodes of procedure provided.

Hence, a

vioJ.at:ion of equal protection of the laws was
held to have taken place.

Likewise, in the

1,:sl:aT"tt ccse there is no reasonable ground, basis
or even a claim why the jury verdict secured by
Pbintiff should be any less respected than a
jury verdict in any other jury case.

A jury

tri.:11 u.:is in fact provided and the uncontroverted

evidence was not only sufficient to

p~ysical

~ictri.:,:mt

JL:r;

upholding the verdict, it compelled the

t:o reach the conclusion that the Defendant's

r: ..::ccuCi1t was negligent.
:::.l:.i~uto::cy
-~~

The constitutional and

provisions aided by the common law to

lffect that a jury verdict is final, unless

L:-n.:i.·.:: i3 no evidence to support it were not

- 42 .ull~:c<l by
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i :::c

I
I

I
i

uc:re the mJ.ny decisions, some of which

c,;_i:cL in this brief, which state that a jury

'.'C::r6::..ct \;ill nev:er be overturned where there is
c:v.Ldence; to

'
'

the court in arriving at its decision.

support it upon which reasonable

QinGs could iind the matter in issue.
"'-u

The result

0ecn a clear denial to Plaintiff of equal

:1rnL:cction of the laws of the State of Utah.
In short, if it is a denial of equal
[hul:cction of the laws to refuse equitable relief
i:o one class of persons only '(Truax v. Corrigan);
to prevent a class of corporations from· being
~urchase:rs

at legal foreclosure sales (Black v.

Calduell); to require special rules of pleading

of a lini.ted class of litigants in a limited
class of cases (Board of Education v. Alliance
:.~;:.:ui-.

~s

Co.); to waive the statute of limitations

to a single favored person (Alton

1:c. ~s-~.~)

v.

Phillips

; to suppress the right to appeal in

c. oiacticular case by refusing preparation of a

- 43 .~~Dscri~t

(AGncw v. Superior Court); to

cuaditioc1 a divorce on the financial capability
oi: t~12 ;il.::i.intiff (Hor9anti v. Uorganti); and to

de1> a ju;.:y to some narcotics addicts on the

issue of addiction depending upon the court used.
(r~,

P,e Tru:-;;:ser), then it is the clearest kind of

a violation of the equal protection clause of the
J.!,th Arc:ec1dnent to take away a duly rendered jury

v.:::rdict without even having colorable jurisdiction
to do so and in the face of clear appellate rules
desiGncd to safeguard jury verdicts.
nesidcs reviewing its opinion in the light of
L[1c

poii1i:s raised above, Plaintiff also

1.es:_)ectfully requests the Court to review its
decision concerning the propriety of Instruction
Plaintiff submits that the instruction
correctly covered the driving duties involved
1Jndc':c the facts.
J'li ·,r

It

could not have misled the

in an:; .....my, especially when viewed in the

- 0 :il:C::t

o.:3 the other instructions.

The Court

II

-

/

:i_::.:::;l:ructcd the jury that there was a

e'· 1~:t

I

.

'nrcccuwnt:::.on

' ~"clA1t
I ,,c._'"'
,._, ,
'

o~

.

of due care on the nart of Defendant's.

p'1ic'1
·..
' ores
•
um? t l.· o n d :.· d not exist in Vif:.'W

the physical facts.

uuavoidable
I

44 -

ac~idents;

It gave an instruction on
an instruction that

Ho.inti££ was required to show ne3ligence by a

!
I .1r2;)on<lcrancc of the evidence; an instruction
Llfo:cminz the jury no exceptional caution was

i."equircd and in Instruction 24 itself again ree;Jf.>hasized the rule that both negligence and
?Io:i:i1nate cause had to be found in the evidence
before a verdict could be returned for Plaintiff.
ln::truction

zc~,

even if improper in some respects

1:hici1 Plaintiff does not concede, could hardly
have been prejudicial when the evidence compelled
the jury to find as it did anyway.

"Prejudicial

error" means error in the sense that in its
ali::ence there is a reasonable likelihood that
U:ere would have been a different result.

Gordon

:::.:_Provo Citl, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964)

- 45 could no!: have been a different result here.
i

~c~~lly plaintiff was entitled to a directed
I
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1

u~

I
I

•

Nevertheless, should the Court believe

l)Jciruction

2L~ \·1as

prejudicially improper in some

ris~cct, then at· oost Defendant is only entitled

to a new trial and not a reversal.
CO?'!CLUSION
The physical evidence analyzed in its
crrcircty not only adequately and sufficiently

1.,'""'
. i~o~"~
... ._..,the jury's verdict, it compelled it.
1

I

;:he Cou;::t erred in evaluating and weighin3 the
evidence at all.

In erred in interpreting it.

;:, :;o do:Lng it arrived at conclusions directly
contr.:i.dicted by the undisputed physical facts.
it lacked jurisdiction even to examine, let alone

, re-determine the ultimate facts as found by the

I

I
I

The decision of the Court denied Plaintiff

I

1

'~U.:il

protection of the laws in that the co·urt

:~iled to apply the normal rules of appellate

- 46 ,._·.;i·.c~1,

~) c;:;_·ticu larly

Scc~ion

•h

~:1e

those respecting a jury

27 of Article 1 of the Constitution

Stn::e of Utah directs that ''Frequent

;.·ccui:rcnce to fundamental principles is essential
to i:hc

sccu:dty of individual rights and the

per;:>ctuity of free government."
Plaintiff asks only that the Court recur to
fonda.rnen'.:al principles in the instant case; that
ic rcrr.it a rehearing; that it recognize that its
~resent

decision is totally out of harmony with

;i;1;ilic.ible constitutional, statutory and cas.e law
principles; and that upon a further hearing the
Cou;:-t a:Efinu the judgment of the lower court

ui1jch entered judgment on the jury verdict.

Respectfully submitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen

NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN
AND HENRIOD
and
J. Harlan Burns

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent

